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COMMENTARIES
AN OVERVIEW OF ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE LAW:
SEVENTY YEARS OF UNEXPLOITED PROTECTION
FOR PREHISTORIC RESOURCES
Victoria Palacios*
Robert L. Johnson**
I. Introduction: The Value of Archaeology
The array of federal legislation which has an impact on archaeological
resources is bewildering. This article examines this legislation and explains its
influence, realized and potential, upon archaeological resources.
Before this examination, however, a more basic question is why the law
should be concerned with our past. Do we have an inherent need to understand
our past? Congress has implicitly recognized such a need: the National Historic
Preservation Act of 19661 states that the historical and cultural heritage of this
country should be preserved in order to "give a sense of orientation" to this na-
tion's people.'
Information about man's past falls into two categories: his biological heri-
tage and his cultural heritage. Knowledge of the biological heritage of humanity
is important in at least two ways. First, it provides the long-range perspective
needed to assess man's impact on the environments and the impact of the environ-
ment on man. This understanding of biological interaction will enhance man's
ability to project his future influence on nature.4 And second, data concerning
man's biological past is useful to geneticists in developing concepts of human and
agricultural eugenics.'
Similarly, knowledge of our cultural heritage is important because it pro-
motes understanding of our sociological selves. The rudiments of religion, law,
social structures, familial relationships, morals and aesthetics-virtually every-
thing which defines man as a unique species--are contained in the annals of
* Hastic Fellow, University of Wisconsin. J.D., University of Nebraska, 1975.
** Graduate Student, University of Nebraska. B.S., University of Utah, 1973; B.S., Weber
State College, 1971; A.S., College of Eastern Utah, 1969.
1 The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970).
2 Id. § 470(b).
3 Since man first began his attempts to control the environment, he has exerted an in-
fluence on his environment which is disproportionate to that exerted by other species. For an
account of the use of fire, including that by early man, see 0. Stewart, Fire as the First Great
Force Employed by Man, in MAN's ROLE IN CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH 115 '(1967).
4 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ARCHEOLOGY AND ARCHEOLOGICAL RESOURCES: A
GuIDE FOR THOSE PLANNING TO USE, AFFECT, OR ALTER THE LAND'S SURFACE 1 "(n.d.)
(1972) [hereinafter cited as ARCHEOLOGICAL RESOURCES].
5 It has been noted that corn, as we know it today, is derived from a cross between ancient
grasses which were crossbred, probably accidentally, by ancient civilizations in Peru and
Mexico. P. C. MANGELSDORF, R. S. MAcNEisH & G. R. WILLEY, ORIGINS OF AGRICULTURE IN
MMDLE AMERiCA, in I HANDBOOR OF MIDDLE AMERICAN INDIANS 427-45 (1964).
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prehistory.6 The following description of man's duration on this planet places
prehistory in perspective:
If we imagine the whole of earth's history compressed into a single year,
then on this scale, the first eight months would be completely without life.
The following two months would be devoted to the most primitive creatures
ranging from viruses and single-celled bacteria to jellyfish, while the mam-
mals would not have appeared until the second week in December. Man, as
we know him would have strutted onto the stage at about 11:45 p.m. on
December 31, and the age of written history would have occupied little more
than the last sixty seconds on the clock.7
Prehistory is even more significant when we consider that written history records
only 5,000 years of man's activities; less than 1,000 of these years contain any
appreciable amount of detail; and only 500 years of that detailed history refers
to America.'
Prehistory, obviously, is very important to man's knowledge about man.
Modem society poses threats to this knowledge however, and thus necessitates
intervention by the legal system. One such threat is the destruction engendered
by modem man's propensity to expand his land use requirements. The encroach-
ments of dams, highways, and housing developments upon archaeological re-
sources are well documented.' The incidence of this destruction is increasing at
an alarming rate. For example, one writer states that in California alone approxi-
mately 1,000 sites are destroyed annually." Another authority on archaeology
and the law, notes that spot checks in Arkansas revealed that 25 percent of the
known archaeological sites in that state have been destroyed over the past 10
years.1 In response to this destruction of the human heritage, Congress made
the following finding in the Historic Preservation Act of 1966:
That, in the face of ever-increasing extension of urban centers, highways,
and residential, commercial, and industrial developments, the present govern-
mental and nongovernmental historic preservation programs and activities
are inadequate to insure future generations a genuine opportunity to appre-
ciate and enjoy the rich heritage of our Nation.12
Another threat to archaeological resources is the pothunter-the individual
who removes an archaeological artifact from the site without regard to its con-
textual provenience and then sells, trades, or collects it as an objet d'art.'
6 In the context of this article prehistory refers to that period of time prior to written
records.
7 R. CARRINGTON, A GuIDE To EARTH HISTORY 47-48 (1961).8 ARCHEOLOGICAL RESOURCES, supra note 4, at 1.
9 B. FAGAN, MEN OF THE EARTH 16 '(1974); F. HOLE, & R. HEIZER, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO PREHIsTorC ARCHEOLOGY (1969); C. McGIMsEY, PUBLIC ARCHEOLOGY 4 (1972).
10 D. THOMAS, PREDICTING THE PAST 32 (1974).
11 McGIMSEY. supra note 9, at 3.
12 16 U.S.C. J 470(d) (1970).
13 For a complete discussion of the looting problem on an international level, seeMeyer, The Plundered Past: I-The Flying Facade and the Vanishing Glyphs, THE NEw
YoRiuR, Mar. 24, 1973, at 96 '(pt. 1); Meyer, The Plundered Past: l1--Sailing from the
Byzantium, THE NEw YoRxER, Mar. 31, 1973, at 80 (pt. 2); Meyer, The Plundered Past:
III-Casino, Palace and Slum, THE NEW YORxKER, Apr. 7, 1973, at 96 (pt. 3).
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Archaeological resources are nonrenewable."' The context in which an archae-
ological artifact or feature is found is at least as important as the artifact or
feature itself, and a site which has been disturbed has permanently lost a con-
siderable amount of its significance.15 As stated by the Committee on the Public
Understanding of Archeology of the Society of American Archaeology:
Archeological resources are akin to an endangered species-even more
endangered-for no matter how hard we work to protect them, they cannot
reproduce or increase.'
Recognizing the importance of protecting American archaeological re-
sources, it is appropriate to examine the legal responses. What protections are
provided by the legal system?
II. Perspectives: Federal Legislation Affecting Archaeological Resources
Prior to the Antiquities Act of 1906,7 the federal government had not
addressed the issue of protection of archaeological resources.- Moreover, limited
discussion in the legislative history of that act indicates that little thought had
been given to historic preservation, nor did the 1906 Act raise much debate."8
Prior to 1906, then, the only protections for these resources were private financing
of excavations and museums, and private legal remedies such as trespass or con-
version. There were no federal regulatory or enabling provisions.
A. The Antiquities Act of 1906
1. Explanation of the Act
The Antiquities Act of 1906 gives the President authority to declare archae-
ological sites and features to be national monuments and to set aside a parcel
of land sufficient for their management. There is, of course, a limitation that the
antiquity be situated on federally owned land; where private land is concerned,
the statute authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to "accept the relinquishment
of such lands."' 9 Clearly, Congress declined at this point to empower the Secre-
tary to use eminent domain in order to obtain sites which may be assessed by
the scientific community as particularly valuable.
Section 432 of the Antiquities Act enables the Secretaries of the Interior,
Agriculture, and the Army to issue permits to institutions for excavations on be-
half of "reputable museums, universities, colleges, or other recognized scientific
or educational institutions."2 Persons excavating archaeological sites on federal
14 ARcHEOLOGICAL R.sOURcEs, supra note 4, at 3.
15 R. HEIzER & J. GRAmAm, A GUIDE TO FIELD METHODS IN ARCHAEOLOGY 74 (1967).
See also Coggins, Archeology and the Art Market, 175 SczNcE 263 (1972).
16 ARcHEOLOGICAL RESOURCES, supra note 4, at 21.
17 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (1970).
18 40 CONG. REc. 7888 (1906) (remarks of Senator Baker). See also Understanding Our
Heritage, TRENDS, Oct-Dec. 1974, at,2.
19 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
20 Id. § 432.
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land without permission are subject to a $500 fine or 90 days incarceration or
both."
There is a tendency among writers to understate the importance of the
Antiquities Act.2 It is not a clarion for the protection of archaeological re-
sources, but it was a beginning." That Congress addressed the issue at all was
an accomplishment. 4 Moreover, it provided the only penal sanction for the
unauthorized excavation of archaeological sites on government property.
2. Impact Today: United States v. Diaz
Recently, in United States v. Diaz,25 the Antiquities Act was enforced
against a defendant who had attempted to sell Indian artifacts taken from a cave
on federal property to an individual whom he later learned was an FBI agent.
The artifacts, according to expert testimony, were fashioned by a tribal medicine
man between 1969 and 1970. The issue was whether objects of this recent origin
were "antiquities" within the meaning of § 433. After further expert testimony,
the district court held that they were. Stating that today's artifacts could easily
become tomorrow's antiquities, the anthropologist testified:
In a case such as this, there can be no specific definite time limit as to when
an object becomes an "antiquity." The determination can be made only
after taking into consideration the object or objects in question, the signif-
icance, if any, of the object and the importance the object plays in a cultural
heritage.26
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed.2 ' The court noted that while it "had
no doubt as to the wisdom of the legislative judgment... that the public interest
in and respect for the culture and heritage of native Americans requires pro-
tection of their sacred places, past and present, against commercial plundering,"2
this protection must not be couched in statutory terms which are impermissibly
vague. It was further stated that, because there was no notice given by the
statute, "antiquity" could refer not only to an aged object but to objects which
were put to a particular use as well.2 9 The effect would be that the individual
could not know with reasonable certainty when he takes up his pick and shovel
which objects he must leave and which he may disturb.
The court in Diaz also noted: "Counsel on neither side was able to cite an
instance prior to this in which conviction under the statute was sought by the
United States.""0 Thus, not only has the Antiquities Act of 1906 been rarely
21 Id. § 433.
22 See, e.g., McGIbsrY, supra note 9, at 111; Shull & Shull, New Inroads for Historic
Preservation, 26 ADmIN. L. Rav. 357 (1974).
23 One writer supposes it to predate any state legislation written specifically to protect
archeology. See McGMsEY, supra note 9, at 102.
24 Understanding Our Heritage, TazNDs, Oct.-Dec. 1974, at 2.
25 368 F. Supp. 856 (D. Ariz. 1973), revzd, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
26 368 F. Supp. at 858.
27 United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
28 Id. at 114.
29 Id. at 115.
30 Id. at 114.
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used, but the Ninth Circuit's declaration that the statute is impermissibly vague
casts doubt as to the future efficacy of the Act. However, although Diaz might
be read to imply that the statute is unconstitutional on its face, it can be argued
that it was only found to be unconstitutionally applied. What offended the
court's notion of fair warning was the "particular use" element of the definition
of "antiquity," that is, an object which is not old, but merely ceremonial-and
thereby indicative of the culture from which it came-could fall within the def-
inition of "antiquity." If a clearer case were presented, where it is obvious even
to the unlearned individual that the objects taken are of ancient origin, then a
conviction under the Antiquities Act of 1906 would be arguably constitutional.
B. Historic Sites Act of 1935
1. Explanation of the Act
The next major piece of legislation to affect archaeological resources on
federally owned property throughout the country was the Historic Sites Act of
1935"1 which declared that it was
national policy to preserve for public use historic sites, buildings, and objects
of national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the
United States.3 2
Under this Act the Secretary of the Interior is responsible for surveying and
cataloguing archaeological sites of exceptional value and national significance. "
He is further empowered to acquire property by "gift, purchase or otherwise" -
provided Congress has appropriated the funding-and to freely contract for the
purpose of preserving archaeological resources regardless of ownership. "5 The
Act creates an advisory board of United States citizens drawn from various his-
torical and scientific fields to advise the Secretary and recommend policies.
2. Litigation Under the Historic Sites Act
In Barnidge v. United States"8 the Eighth Circuit interpreted the phrase "or
otherwise" relating to the Secretary's powers of acquisition authorizing the use
of eminent domain. 7 In response to the appellant's argument that his land was
not being taken for "public use," the court stated that the right to determine
that a particular purpose is a "public use" lies within the powers of Congress,
and that it was not unconstitutional for the Legislature to have delegated this
power to the Secretary of the Interior. Thus, on the Secretary's determination
31 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-67 (1970).
32 Id. § 461.
33 This was the beginning of what would later be called the "National Register." 16 U.S.C.§ 470a (1970).
34 Id. § 462(d).
35 Id.
36 101 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1939).
37 Id. at 297-98.
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that certain land in St. Louis, Missouri, "possessed exceptional value as com-
memorating... the history of the United States,""8 eminent domain was exer-
cised to procure the land.
Since Barnidge, the Eighth Circuit has twice applied the provision of the
Historic Sites Act to eminent domain proceedings. None of these cases dealt
specifically with the acquisition of archaeological sites, but the court's reasoning
is at least indicative of the potential impact of the Act on the preservation of
archaeological resources.
C. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA)
1. Explanation of the Act
The first truly broad-based legislation providing a means for preserving
archaeological artifacts and sites was the Historic Preservation Act of 1966.4'
The Act is more affirmative than previous legislation, stating that it is
necessary and appropriate for the Federal Government to accelerate its his-
toric preservation programs and activities, [and] to give maximum encourage-
ment to agencies and individuals undertaking preservation [as well as] state
and local governments .... 41
The Act expands the cataloguing system begun in the Historic Sites Act of 1935,
and entities it the National Register.4" Most remarkable about the Act, however,
is its funding provisions; it authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to grant funds
to the states for the purpose of surveying, nominating, and maintaining sites for
the Register. Matching grants-in-aid can also be awarded to the states for their
own programs for preservation of historic and prehistoric sites, so long as those
programs are in accordance with a comprehensive state plan which has been
approved by the Secretary."3
Section 470f of the NHPA facilitates the preservation of archaeological
sites by directing appropriate federal agencies to "take into account" the effect of
projects upon structures or sites listed on the National Register prior to making
expenditures of federal monies or issuing licenses.4 While "take into account"
is a mild directive, the Act laid the groundwork for subsequent statutes which
would require compliance with federal historic preservation legislation prior to
receiving a federal license or federal funding.
A final contribution of the Historic Preservation Act of 1966 is its establish-
ment of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. 5 The 20-person Council
38 Id. at 296.
39 O'Donnel v. United States, 131 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1942); United States v. Becktold
Co., 129 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1942). For a discussion of the use of eminent domain in historic
preservation, see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLiEs & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
40 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970).
41 Id. See notes 1 and 12 and accompanying text supra.
42 16 U.S.C. § 470a (1970).
43 Id. § 470b.
44 Id. § 470f.
45 Id. § 470i.
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consists of representatives from various departments and agencies of the federal
government and individuals who have significant interest and experience in the
matters to be considered by the Council. The Council is purely advisory in
nature, yet does offer a body of experts to whom Congress and the President
can look for recommendations. 46
Procedures developed for compliance with § 470f of NHPA require that
federal agencies involved in projects which are carried out, licensed, or financially
assisted by the federal government should, at the earliest planning stage, consult
the National Register of Historic Places to determine whether a National Register
item will be affected. The agency is to ascertain whether the undertaking creates
a change in the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural character
which initially qualified the property to be listed in the Register. Absent such
change, the project may proceed as planned.4 If it is determined that there
would be an adverse effect (including, but not limited to, destruction or alteration
of the character), then the agency is to select a "prudent and feasible alternative
to remove the adverse effect," thus allowing the project to proceed. Failing to
achieve such a solution, the agency is to recommend all possible planning in order
that the adverse effect may be minimized and to delay further work until the
Advisory Council makes recommendations. 8
Aside from the Advisory Council's opportunity to comment, it would seem
that, except for procedural shortcomings on the part of the agency in charge, a
project will eventually be able to proceed regardless of the relative severity of
the damage it may do to the items supposedly protected by the Historic Pres-
ervation Act.49 In fact the Act may be counterproductive in some circumstances.
Because the location of sites of the Register becomes common knowledge through
its publication, many states will not nominate an otherwise deserving site unless
there are adequate means of protecting it from destruction by the public. Further,
the fact that a site which will be affected by a federal project is not listed on the
Register may lead an agency to erringly conclude that it is not significant.
2. Litigation Under the NHPA
To the extent that the Act forces agencies to give consideration to a federal
project's impact on historical and archaeological resources, the NHPA has been
effective." In Thompson v. Fugate,5 for example, the owner of a parcel of land
upon which an historic landmark listed on the National Register was located
sought to enjoin further highway construction. Although the state had not yet
requested federal approval of the route, the district court found it to be within
46 Id. § 470j.
47 The procedure for compliance with this statute is established in 36 Fed. Reg. 3312
(1971).
48 0. G.A Y, ENVmONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERtL S 737-38 (1973).
49 Kent County Council for Historic Preservation v. Romney, 304 F. Supp. 885 (W.D.
Mich. 1969).
50 For more detailed discussion of litigation under NHPA, see Shull & Shull, New Inroads
for Historic Preservation, 26 ADMiN. L. Rav. 357 (1974); Comment, The National Historic
Preservation Act: Ten Years Later, 7 Sw. U. L. Rav. 688 (1975).
51 347 F. Supp. 120 '(E.D. Va. 1972).
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the purview of federal legislation because the highway would be built according
to federal interstate standards and would eventually be an integral part of the
circumferential urban highway connecting with the interstate system. The federal
court enjoined further construction pending compliance with both the National
Historical Preservation Act and the National Environmental Policy Act, holding
that construction had not reached the state of completion at which "the costs
of altering or abandoning the proposed location would outweigh whatever bene-
fits might be derived therefrom."52
In another case, Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble,5" the plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the awarding of a contract for the construction of a segment of
a dam project. Their attack was two-pronged: first, the sufficiency of the en-
vironmental impact statement required by the National Environmental Protec-
tion Act was challenged;54 and second, it was argued that sites in the affected
area might be eligible for inclusion in the National Register under the National
Historic Preservation Act.
As to the issue concerning the NIIPA, the court held that meeting the
environmental impact statement requirements under the National Environmental
Protection Act did not necessarily constitute compliance with the NHPA require-
ment for federal agencies to nominate sites to the National Register.5"
If the Secretary of the Interior determines that certain sites affected by the
project might qualify for inclusion in the Register, the appropriate federal agency
is required to give the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation an opportunity
to comment before substantial alterations can be made.
D. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
1. Explanation of the Act as it Relates to Archaeology
Another major piece of federal legislation which had an impact upon archae-
ological resources is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)."s
Designed to create a national policy of preventing or eliminating damage to the
environment and biosphere, the Act provides that:
[I]t is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with
State and local governments, and other concerned public and private organ-
izations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and
technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general
welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other
requirements of present and future generations of Americans. 7
52 Id. at 125.
53 378 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rez'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 1301 (1974)
(order by Douglas, J., sitting as Circuit Judge).
54 For a discussion of the issue concerning the adequacy of the environmental impact state-
ment, see notes 80-83 and accompanying text infra.
55 These requirements are actually pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11,593, 3 C.F.R. 154
(1971).
56 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
57 Id. § 4331(a).
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The Act puts the nation in the position of "trustee of the environment for suc-
ceeding generations""8 and states that it is the nation's duty to
preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national
heritage, and [to] maintain, wherever possible, an environment which sup-
ports diversity and variety of individual choice.5 9
To accomplish these and other ends NEPA directs federal agencies to pre-
pare an environmental impact statement (EIS) on "proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human en-
vironment."6 Without establishing the relative weight to be given various ele-
ments contained in the EIS, NEPA directs an agency to make its decisions in
consideration of what appears in the statement.
In addition, the Act creates the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),
a body which has the authority to issue guidelines"' to federal agencies regarding
the preparation of environmental impact statements.62 The EIS must contain a
description of the proposed action, its probable impact on the environment,
alternatives to the action, the probable adverse environmental effects which can-
not be avoided, together with a description of "[a]ny irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources that would be involved in the proposed action" if the
action is implemented. 3 The CEQ guidelines further instruct that the term
"resources" should not be limited to mean merely the labor and materials utilized
in a project, but should be used to include the natural and cultural resources
which would be destroyed in the course of the project."
An integrated reading of the above provisions sets forth the basis for pro-
tection of archaeological resources under the National Environmental Protection
Act. With varying success, a number of attempts have been made to use those
provisions to halt the destruction of particular historic and prehistoric sites. Most
plaintiffs have asserted both NEPA and NHPA as grounds for relief; con-
sequently, it is difficult to ascertain how much of a court's decision rests on the
NEPA and how much on NHPA, unless an opinion specifically addresses the
matter.
2. Litigation Concerning Historic and Prehistoric Preservation
The plaintiffs in Ely v. Velde65 attempted to bring the requirements of
NEPA and NHPA to bear upon the State of Virginia's construction of a correc-
tional facility in an area containing several National Register sites. The oppo-
nents of the project feared that the locality's historical value would be diminished
by reason of the proposed center. Virginia had applied for funds through the
58 Id. § 4331 (b) (1).
59 Id. § 4311(b) (4).
60 Id. § 4332(C).
61 See 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970).
62 Exec. Order No. 11,593, 3 C.F.R. 154, 157 (1971).
63 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 4332(C)'(v) (1975).
64 38 Fed. Reg. 20554 (1973).
65 363 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act of 1968.66 The Safe Streets Act enunciated
a "hands-off" policy on the part of the federal government after the money
had been awarded to avoid the establishment of a federal police agency. The
Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA), the federal agency charged with
administering the Act, admitted not complying with NEPA and NHPA, arguing
that the Safe Streets Act's policy of minimal interference prohibited it from
doing so. The district court agreed with the defendants. However, the Fourth
Circuit reversed on appeal,67 finding no contradiction between the two sets of
federal legislation. Judge Sobeloff wrote that requiring the LEAA to gather
enough information to "assess the environmental and cultural impact of the pro-
posed plan... would not remotely approach the apprehended 'control over any
police force or other law enforcement agency' ,,68 prohibited by the Safe Streets
Act. Since the area in question contained three sites listed on the National
Register of Historic Sites, the court went on to require that the LEAA comply
with NHPA requirements, and that LEAA submit an EIS in accordance with
the National Environmental Policy Act as well. The court, however, concluded
by reiterating that while NHPA and NEPA were applicable to federal agencies,
the Acts did not apply to the states.
Accordingly, Virginia then withdrew its application for federal funds, re-
storing the project to its former, entirely state-funded status. The opponents of
the center once again sought to have the district court force compliance with
NHPA and NEPA on the ground that: (1) impermissible bookkeeping shifts
were utilized to avoid compliance, and (2) once a project has been designated
federal, that designation is irrevocable.69 The arguments were unsuccessful. The
district court held that the plaintiffs had not shown that the bookkeeping shifts
enabled Virginia to directly or indirectly use federal funds for a project which
had purportedly been sponsored by the state."0 It further held that a project
may be tentatively designated "federal" without that designation becoming
irrevocable. 1
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed that the program had not become
"irrevocably" designated federal." It reversed the district court, however, on the
ground that federal funding was sought in the first instance to assist in the con-
struction of the penal complex. The court found it significant that the state was
"retaining federal funds that it [had] obtained for the center on the premise that
it would comply with federal environmental Acts, while at the same time it
[planned] to construct the center without compliance."" Thus, the state would
be able to proceed with its project without meeting NEPA and NHPA require-
ments only if it relinquished its federal funding.
66 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701, 3711, 3751-
3769 (1970).
67 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
68 Id. at 1136-37.
69 363 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Va. 1973), reu'd, 497 F.2d 252 '(4th Cir. 1974).
70 363 F. Supp. at 283.
71 Id. at 285.
72 497 F.2d at 257.
73 Id. at 256.
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Sierra Club v. Callawaf' dealt peripherally with the notion of prehistoric
sites and the EIS. The dispute concerned the Wallisville Project which was to
be constructed in the Trinity River Basin in Texas. In addition to its many other
implications concerning environmental law and NEPA, the decision further
substantiated the notion that archaeological resources have a place on the en-
vironmental impact statement.
A decision which could potentially hinder those seeking to protect archaeo-
logical resources is St. Joseph Historical Society v. Land Clearance for Redevelop-
ment Authority. 5 The conflict arose in an urban renewal project, where some of
the buildings scheduled for demolition had been nominated for or had won
places on the National Register. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to have NEPA
and NHPA requirements applied to the renewal project in order to avoid the
destruction of some of the sites. The court for the Western District of Missouri
held that because the historic sites were not on the National Register prior to
approval of the urban renewal project, the NHPA requirement that the federal
agency take into account the effect of the project on such historic sites was not
applicable." The court further held that NEPA was directed at the overall
environmental problems of the nation and was not intended to expand the
coverage of NHPA7
The court's reasoning on this second holding is not dear. It began by stating
that the plaintiffs were erroneous in their reliance upon the Fourth Circuit's
announcement in Ely that NEPA and NHPA requirements were not nullified
by the Safe Streets Act.7  According to the St. Joseph court, though, the facts
before it could be readily distinguished from those before the Ely court. This
much is correct. But what the St. Joseph court disregarded is that, even at the
time of the first decision in Ely, the Fourth Circuit was willing to require the
federal agency in charge to comply with the NEPA directive that the project's
impact-including the historical impact-was to be considered in the EIS.
Requiring the project agency to prepare an EIS which includes the his-
torical impact does not, however, expand the coverage of NHPA as the court in
St. Joseph implied. The plaintiff's contention that NEPA "protects buildings of
architectural and historic significance whether or not they are listed in the Na-
tional Register,""8 provided they otherwise fall within the scope of NEPA is
correct. Thus, while NEPA was not intended to expand the provisions of NHPA,
it may apply to certain historic and prehistoric resources independent of NHPA.
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, discussed briefly in the previous
section," also considered the argument that the EIS was deficient by reason of
incomplete and inaccurate studies on the archaeological portion of the statement.
74 Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd sub norm. Sierra
Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
75 366 F. Supp. 605 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
76 Id. at 609.
77 Id. at 612.
78 At the time the St. Joseph court delivered its opinion, the plaintiffs in Ely had not yet
made their second appeal to the Fourth Circuit.
79 366 F. Supp. at 609.
80 378 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 417 U.S. 1301 (1974), discussed in note 53
and accompanying text supra.
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The standard which had been established by the Ninth Circuit for judging the
sufficiency of an EIS is that it must stimulate "a full examination of all objections,
adverse consequences, alternatives and . . . possible operational limitations." '
Summarizing the Ninth Circuit's view the district court stated that the purpose of
the EIS is "to inform the decision makers of the environmental ramifications of
the proposed action, nothing more and nothing less." 2 The district court in
Warm Springs Dam Task Force, applying this standard, deemed that while this
segment of the EIS had its "obvious shortcomings" it was not deficient.8 3 The
court felt that overall the EIS met the statutory requirements. The plaintiffs then
applied to the Ninth Circuit for an injunction pending appeal. When that motion
was denied, they applied to the Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit for a stay of
the order of the district court and a stay to restrain further construction on the
dam project. Justice Douglas, sitting as Circuit Justice, granted the stay on the
basis of evidence tending to show that the district court did not give sufficient
weight to a determination by the Council on Environmental Quality that the EIS
was inadequately prepared. He pointed out that since the CEQ is the agency
charged with administration of NEPA and since it had taken an "unequivocal
position" that the statement was deficient, the agency's determination was en-
titled to great weight despite the district court's conclusions.
The difficulty with trying to assess the significance of this decision to the
preservation of archaeological resources lies in its chameleon-like characteristic.
In the district court, much discussion was given to the adequacy of the EIS with
respect to certain archaeological sites. Justice Douglas' discussion, however,
appears to be much more concerned with other aspects of the EIS, and the
decision itself turned on how much weight was to be given an agency determi-
nation of EIS adequacy. Thus, it is only speculation to say how important the
archaeological aspects were in the Court's decision.
While none of the above cases can be classified as legal landmarks for the
protection of historic and prehistoric resources, there is promise. Archaeological
considerations have found a place on the EIS and are among the legitimate con-
siderations that the EIS is supposed to prompt. Likewise, at least for those sites
on the National Register, federal agencies must evaluate a proposed action's effect
on these sites. Yet by turning to Congress and away from the courts, archaeolog-
ical protectionists may find a more expeditious, effective remedy. Certainly a
beginning can be found in the Moss-Bennett Amendment.
III. The Reservoir Salvage Act and the Moss-Bennett Amendment
The Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960 together with the changes made by the
Moss-Bennett Amendment"' is the most recent federal legislation in the area of
historical resources, and it may well be the most important.
81 Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814, 822 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 974, reh. denied sub nom., Environmental Defense Fund v. Stare, 419 U.S.
1041 (1974).
82 378 F. Supp. at 244.
83 Id. at 251.
84 16 U.S.C. § 469 et seq. (1970).
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A. The Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960 Prior to the Moss-Bennett Amendment
The Reservoir Salvage Act (commonly known as Salvage Act) was passed
in 1960 in an attempt to minimize federal contribution to the increasing losses of
historic and prehistoric data caused by this country's expanding land use needs.
The act was designed to enable federal agencies involved in federal water projects
(dams and reservoirs) to take action to preserve archaeological resources. These
federal agencies were required to notify the Secretary of the Interior of proposed
water projects (excepting projects under a designated size). The Secretary was
responsible for making a survey of the site and where significant data was found,
the Secretary was to provide for its recovery and preservation.8 5 The Act further
authorized the Secretary to enter into contracts, hire experts and use donated or
appropriated funds to conduct the program. " The Salvage Act further man-
dated that the Secretary keep the appropriate agency head informed of salvage
progress and that he determine ownership of salvaged artifacts according to con-
sultation with all interested parties.
B. The Moss-Bennett Amendment
The Moss-Bennett Amendment of the 1960 Salvage Act brought consider-
able change. The dominant purpose in enacting the amendment according to
the legislative history was to
expand the application of the 1960 Act providing for the preservation of
historical and archeological data to include all Federal and federally assisted
construction projects, rather than being limited to Federal dam and reservoir
sites.87
At the same time, the Congress was concerned that undue interference or delay
of federal projects and programs should be avoided. The amendment sought to
vest additional responsibility in the Secretary of the Interior as well.88
To broaden the scope of the former act, language was added which extended
coverage to "any alteration of the terrain caused as a result of any Federal con-
struction project or federally licensed activity or program."8 9 Unlike the former
provision, the act is no longer limited in application to construction projects.
Where a federal agency becomes aware that any federal program or federally
assisted activity will result in the destruction of scientific, prehistoric or historic
data, that agency is required to notify the Secretary of the Interior."
The Moss-Bennett Amendment also represents the first attempt by Congress
to legislate concerning archaeological resources located upon private lands.
Section 3 provides that where federal assistance in the form of grants or loans is
85 These requirements are actually pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11,593. 3 Fed. Reg. 154
(1971).
86 H. R. REP. No. 992, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974).
87 Id. at 3.
88 Id. at 7.
89 16 U.S.C. § 469'(1970).
90 Id. § 469a-1 (a).
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awarded to private individuals, private associations or public organizations, the
Secretary, if he has the consent of those having a legal interest in the project, may
conduct a survey and take measures to recover and preserve the archaeological
resources. The Secretary is also authorized to compensate for losses suffered as
a result of such salvage operations."
Upon receipt of notice that irreparable damage is being done to historic
and prehistoric sites by any federal project, the Secretary, after reasonable notice
to the agency, is to conduct a survey and recover and preserve such data as the
public interest requires." The Act provides, however, that these requirements
do not apply to federal actions taken as a result of any emergency, for example,
natural disasters. 3 The Secretary is given sixty days in which to initiate the sur-
vey,9" and thus avoid undue delays.95
Section 4 requires the Secretary to keep the responsible agency appraised of
the progress of salvage work undertaken in order to give agencies adequate notice
required to avoid delays.9" Under the new law the Secretary is authorized to con-
suit interested parties, including "federal and state agencies, educational and
scientific organizations and private institutions and qualified individuals." 7 This
section also directs the Secretary to act as national coordinator and reporter on
all federal surveys and recovery activities authorized under the act.
The new law further enables the Secretary to consult with experts and
accept funds made available by any source for the purpose of salvage archaeol-
ogy."' Section 7 enables the project agency to expend up to 1% of the project
funds on salvage." Other budgetary provisions enable the Secretary to accom-
plish much more for archaeological preservation under the Moss-Bennett version
than he could under the former legislation.'
The Moss-Bennett Amendment effects two major changes. First, it provides
for funding of the survey and salvage activities necessary to preserve archaeologi-
cal resources. Funding has been a leading problem in past efforts in historic and
prehistoric preservation even where the parties concerned were willing to co-
operate with the salvage work. Now it is possible to use project funds to carry
out some of these objectives. There is a question, however, whether the 1%
allocated will be sufficient to defray the costs of all the preservation work that
needs to be done.'
The second major change of the Moss-Bennett Amendment is that it sub-
stantially broadens the scope of the Salvage Act. Where the Act was formerly
restricted to federal water construction projects, it now applies to any federal
91 Id. § 469a-1(b).
92 Id. § 469a-2(a).
93 Id. § 469a-2(b).
94 Id. § 469a-2(c).
95 H.R. R.P. No. 992, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974).
96 16 U.S.C. § 469a-3(a) (1970).
97 Id. § 469a-3 (b).
98 Id. § 469b.
99 Id. § 469c(a). The one per cent limitation is not applicable where the total project
funding does not exceed $50,000.
100 Id. § 469d(b)-(c).
101 Telephone interview with Gary S. Messinger, Congressional Liaison Advisory Council
on Historic Preservation. Oct. 24, 1975.
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construction project or federally licensed activity which alters the terrain.
Whatever the apparent promise of the Act, it leaves much to be done in the
area of preservation of archaeological resources. Some of the problems of liti-
gation under the former statutes will remain. For example, it remains to be seen
what constitutes an "alteration of the terrain." And, as with NEPA, it remains
to be seen what constitutes a "Federal construction project or federally licensed
activity."
IV. Summary and Conclusion
Congress has explicitly declared that it is a national policy to preserve
archaeological resources. The same declaration has been made implicitly in the
context of a more general policy of preserving natural resources as a means of
promoting a beneficial balance in our environment. Moreover, these declarations
call for a greater role by the federal government in enacting these policies.
One of the most important things to remember about the federal legislation
is that it applies to federal agencies only. Congress cannot impose its will on
state agencies concerning this matter. Note, however, that the Congress can
direct a federal agency to condition federal assistance to state agencies upon com-
pliance with certain requirements.
Thus, it would seem that all federal actions are potentially within the federal
statutory scheme. Determining whether a particular federal project falls within
the federal scheme is possible by looking to the particular statute involved. Thus,
if a federal action "significantly affects the environment," it falls within NEPA.
If a federal action involves an alteration of the terrain and historic or prehistoric
resources may be irreparably lost, it falls within the Salvage Act. And if a federal
project affects a site listed on the National Register or one which is significant in
archaeology, it comes within the purview of the NHPA.
Certain nonfederal projects can come within the ambit of the federal stat-
utes. Both private and public actions may be deemed "federal projects" by virtue
of their affiliation with larger federal projects, federal funding in the form of
loans or grants, federal licensing, or other forms of federal assistance. Absent one
of these connections or conditions, however, federal legislation exerts no influence
over archaeological resources on state or private lands." 2
Once it is determined that the federal statutes apply, it is necessary to con-
sider the range of protection afforded the resources in question. "Consideration"
is one form of protection provided under NEPA, NHPA and the Salvage Act.
By including archaeological resources among the disciplines to be studied in the
EIS, the law, to the extent that it can, requires agencies to make their decisions
in consideration of resultant impact on archaeological resources. Under NHPA
and the Salvage Act, decisions cannot be made until the Secretary of the Interior
has had an opportunity to comment upon the effect of the project on any
archaeological data which may be endangered. It is difficult to determine, how-
ever, the extent to which this mandatory consideration actually results in the
102 For a complete, nonlegal breakdown of state archeological projection, see McGMsY,
supra note 9.
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statutory purpose Congress sought to effect.
A very important protection provided by the NHPA and the Salvage Act
is financial assistance. The NHPA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to
supplement the development of archaeological sites, and it assists with regard to
sites listed on the National Register. One of the key contributions of the Moss-
Bennett Amendment to the Salvage Act is the authorization for project agencies
to draw upon a certain percentage of project monies for salvage work.
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the federal legislation to the protection
of archaeology is that it begins to give direction to archaeological excavations on
a national level. Despite the fact that much federal legislation on archaeology is
of an emergency nature, there now exists, in theory at least, national coordination
of information on archaeology through the National Register and the reporting.
requirements placed upon the Secretary of the Interior by the Moss-Bennett
Amendment. This could possibly herald a change from primarily salvage pro-
tection for archaeology to an approach which seeks to do more than keep ahead
of the graders.
A number of statutes discussed in this article have been in effect for many
years. Yet an examination of the case law under the statutes and the literature
concerning the fast depletion of archaeological resources demonstrate that they
have not been utilized to a great extent to foster the preservation of prehistoric
resources. Although an extensive collection of empirical data pointing to reasons
for the nonuse of this legislation is beyond the scope of this article, there are
several possibilities.
First, it is possible that the lack of funding has prevented persons interested
in prehistoric preservation from employing the statutes. The legal costs involved
may have acted as a deterrent in a field which finds itself low on the list of
public spending priorities.
Detection of circumstances which give rise to the applicability of the statutes
may ,be a problem as well. Even though the contracting officer for the federal
agency may be aware that archaeological evidence may be under the protection
of federal law, the operator of the grader which exposes such evidence may be
ignorant of that fact. He may also be unaware of the often subtle signs of the
existence of an archaeological site or feature. The judgmental component of site
assessment further complicates the issue.
A final and more plausible partial explanation for the nonuse of some of this
legislation is that early laws had little built-in enforcement. The amended
Salvage Act and NEPA contain reporting provisions which tend to make those
acts self-executing. Moreover, the single criminal provision which protects
archaeological resources is perhaps understandably low on the F.B.I.'s priority
list of criminal targets.
Despite the fact that much of the federal statutory protection has lain
dormant for nearly 70 years, it is hoped that newer statutory provisions and the
continuing interest in a broad spectrum of environmental concerns will help to
slow down the alarming rate at which we are destroying our prehistory.
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